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1.-­‐	  Spanish	  background	  




Human	  beings	   love	  to	  join	  with	  members	  of	  their	  group.	  People	  tend	  to	  pair	  up	  with	  
individuals	   of	   similar	   characteristics.	   If,	   in	   a	  multi-­‐racial	   country	   like	   the	  USA,	   all	   the	  
population	  decided	  to	  be	  married	  irrespective	  of	  the	  race	  of	  the	  partner,	   in	  only	  two	  
generations	   the	   racial	   problems	   would	   be	   solved.	   Therefore,	   should	   the	   authorities	  
impose	  interracial	  marriage?	  Obviously	  they	  couldn’t	  do	  so	  because	  individuals	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  choose	  their	  spouses1.	  	  
In	  fact,	  some	  scholars	  affirm	  that	  the	  word	  “discrimination”	  has	  two	  different	  meanings,	  
and	  therefore	  can	  be	  used	  in	  a	  neutral	  or	  pejorative	  sense.	  Originally	  it	  connoted	  the	  act	  
of	  distinguishing	  between	  several	  things,	  but	  not	  necessary	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  one	  
of	  them2.	  The	  underlying	  problem	  is	  of	  major	  importance,	  and	  cannot	  be	  only	  simplified	  
to	   distinguish	   between	  moral	   and	   immoral	   behaviours,	   rather	   it	   refers	   to	   a	   collision	  
between	   two	   fundamental	   rights,	   a	   collision	   in	  which	   only	   one	   can	   prevail	   over	   the	  
other.	  
	  
1.-­‐	  SPANISH	  BACKGROUND	  
-­‐	  Private	  autonomy	  and	  equality	  principle	  
There	   is	  a	  unanimous	  agreement	  that	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  bind	  the	  public	  powers	  
(art.	  53	  Spanish	  Constitution)	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  these	  fundamental	  rights	  can	  impact	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  See	  Edward,	  David,	  “Non-­‐Discrimination	  as	  a	  Legal	  Concept”,	  	  in	  	  Non-­‐discrimination	  in	  European	  
Private	  Law,	  ed.	  By.	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  Schulze,	  Tübigen,	  2011,	  p.3.	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  David,	  “Non-­‐Discrimination…”	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the	  relations	  between	   individuals.	  Our	  private	   legal	  system	  is	  based	  on	  the	   liberty	  to	  
choose	  the	  person	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  with.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  affirmed	  that	  nobody	  
could	  argue	  discrimination	  when	  or	  if	  the	  landlord	  chooses	  another	  person	  as	  a	  tenant.	  
The	  reason	  is	  simple,	  the	  landlord	  has	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  freely	  with	  whom	  he	  enters	  
into	  a	  contract,	  and	  with	  whom	  not,	  without	  giving	  any	  reasons.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  it	  is	  
said	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  an	  apartment	  could	  use	  racist	  or	  sexist	  reasons	  to	  deny	  admission	  
to	   third	   parties	   in	   his	   home3.	   The	   right	   to	   privacy	   would	   legally	   protect	   him.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   law	   establishes	   limits	   to	   be	   observed	   by	   individuals	   in	   their	  
relationships.	  The	  question	  is	  to	  determine	  which	  could	  be	  the	  limits	  to	  this	  liberty	  to	  
choose	  freely	  the	  person	  to	  contract	  with.	  	  
In	  this	  scenario	  we	  could	  find	  a	  collision	  between	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
equality.	  Both	  rights	  are	  deemed	  as	  superior	  values	  by	  the	  first	  article	  of	  the	  Spanish	  
Constitution	  (SC)4.	  Moreover,	  article	  14	  SC	  considers	  the	  right	  to	  equality	  as	  a	  principle	  
and	  the	  article	  18	  SC	  deems	  the	  right	  to	  intimacy	  as	  a	  fundamental	  right.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  
is	  not	  possible	  to	  establish	  a	  general	  order	  of	  priority	  between	  them.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
private	  autonomy	  is	  not	  a	  fundamental	  right,	  even	  though	  it	  derives	  from	  the	  of	  free	  
development	  of	  personality	  contemplated	  by	  article	  10	  SC5.	  However,	  article	  10	  SC	  is	  
projected	  onto	  the	  fundamental	  rights,	  in	  fact	  respect	  of	  dignity	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  
fundamental	  rights.	  
Private	   autonomy,	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   right	   to	   the	   free	   development	   of	   the	  
personality,	  enables	  us	  not	  only	  to	  regulate	  freely	  our	  relations	  with	  other	  individuals,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Not	  all	   the	  scholars	  agree.	  Some	  of	   them	  believe	  that	   in	  no	  circumstances	  could	  be	  alleged	  racist	  or	  
sexist	  reasons	  to	  justify	  a	  behavior,	  therefore	  it	  all	  comes	  down	  to	  a	  problem	  of	  evidence.	  Some	  scholars	  
affirm	  that	  the	  word	  “discrimination”	  has	  two	  different	  meanings,	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  used	  in	  a	  neutral	  
or	   pejorative	   sense.	   Originally	   it	   connoted	   the	   act	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   several	   things,	   but	   not	  
necessary	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  one	  of	  them.	  Edward,	  David,	  “Non-­‐Discrimination	  as	  a	  Legal	  Concept”,	  	  
in	  Non-­‐discrimination	  in	  European	  Private	  Law,	  ed.	  By.	  Reiner	  Schulze,	  Tübigen,	  2011,	  p.3.	  
4	  First	  Article	  of	  Spanish	  Constitution:	  Spain	  is	  hereby	  established	  as	  a	  social	  and	  democratic	  State,	  subject	  
to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  which	  advocates	  as	  the	  highest	  values	  of	  its	  legal	  order,	  liberty,	  justice,	  equality	  and	  
political	  pluralism	  
5	   Art.	   10	   SC:	   The	   human	   dignity,	   the	   inviolable	   and	   inherent	   rights,	   the	   free	   development	   of	   the	  
personality,	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  law	  and	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  are	  the	  foundation	  of	  political	  order	  and	  
social	  peace.	  	  
CODERCH,	  Salvador,	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  Asociaciones...,	  p.22.	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but	   to	   choose	   the	   person	   you	   wish	   to	   contract	   with.	   As	   Professor	   Alfaro	   has	   said,	  
individuals	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  require	  others	  to	  contract	  with	  them,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
fact	   that	  perhaps	   they	  could	  have	  contracted	   in	  advance	  with	  another	  person	   in	   the	  
same	  circumstances.	  The	  fact	  that	  reasonable	  available	  alternatives	  exist	   implies	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  general	  right	  to	  refuse	  the	  offer,	  and	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  certain	  scholars,	  
determines	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  is	  unnecessary	  between	  private	  parties.	  In	  fact,	  
it	  is	  said	  that	  to	  claim	  its	  application	  between	  individuals	  would	  be	  unconstitutional6.	  	  
We	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  private	  autonomy	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  active	  and	  positive	  
side	  of	  the	  personality;	  the	  area	  where	  the	  human	  being	  can	  act	  independently	  on	  his	  
own	   responsibility,	   and	   where	   the	   individual	   is	   not	   reduced	   to	   a	   simple	   mean	   of	  
achieving	  collective	  targets7.	  
-­   Direct	  or	  indirect	  horizontal	  application	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights?	  
The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  link	  the	  right	  to	  equality	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  party	  
autonomy.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  apply	  the	  so	  called	  Drittwirkung	  theory.	  	  
This	  German	  approach	  to	  the	  problem	  tries	  to	  explain	  how	  fundamental	  rights	  affect	  the	  
horizontal	   relations	   between	   individuals,	   therefore	   it	   refers	   to	   a	   case	   of	   horizontal	  
application	  of	  fundamental	  rights8.	  	  
We	  can	  distinguish	  two	  different	  doctrinal	  lines	  within	  the	  German	  scenario	  where	  this	  
doctrine	  was	  created.	  Part	  of	  the	  legal	  opinion	  considered	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  only	  
link	  the	  public	  powers	  and	  not	  the	  relations	  between	  private	  parties.	   In	  other	  words,	  
they	   affect	   the	   vertical	   relations	   but	   not	   the	   horizontal	   ones	   (this	   means	   that	   the	  
Constitution	   imposes	  on	  authorities	   to	   apply	   the	   fundamental	   rights,	   but	  not	  on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  ALFARO,	  Jesús,	  “Libertad	  e	  igualdad	  en	  el	  derecho	  de	  asociación”,	  AAVV,	  Los	  alardes:	  
una	  perspectiva	  jurídica.	  Libertad	  e	  igualdad	  en	  las	  relaciones	  entre	  particulares,	  2000,	  
p.129.	  
Furthermore,	  CODERCH,	  Salvador,	   in	  the	  introduction	  of	  Asociaciones,	  derechos	  fundamentals	  y	  
autonomía	  privada	  by	  Von	  Münch,	  Ingo,	  Coderch,	  Salvador	  and	  Ferrer	  I	  Riba,	  Josep,	  Madrid	  1997,	  p.23,	  
affirms	   that	   currently	   and	   historically	   there	   is	   not	   a	   real	   constitutional	   order	   that	   deny	   the	   private	  
autonomy.	  
7	  HESSE,	  Konrad,	  Verfassungsrecht	  und	  Privatrecht,	  Heidelberg,	  1988,	  p.35	  
8	  Some	  scholars	  prefer	  to	  name	  it	  the	  privatization	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  what	  is	  not	  really	  correct	  as	  we	  
apply	  Constitutional	  law.	  MÜNCH,	  Ingo,	  Asociaciones…	  p.32.	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individuals).	  Only	  through	  the	  action	  of	  a	  judge	  could	  indirectly	  impact	  the	  constitutional	  
principles	  on	  the	  concrete	  case	  to	  be	  solved.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  the	  
fundamental	  rights	  generate	  a	  direct	  effectiveness	  on	  the	  private	  sphere,	  although	  in	  a	  
relative	  manner.	  Finally,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  prevailed	  over	  
the	   position	   of	   the	   German	   Federal	   Labour	   Court,	   and	   therefore,	   the	   indirect	  
Drittwirkung	  prevailed	  over	  the	  direct	  Drittwirkung	  theory9.	  This	  indirect	  Drittwirkung	  
theory	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Constitutional	  Court10.	  
It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  the	  unmittelbare	  Drittwirkung	  (the	  direct	  one)	  ignores	  the	  function	  
of	  the	  lawmaker,	  who	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  judge.	  Therefore,	  critics	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  
is	   not	   the	   role	   of	   a	   judge	   to	   apply	   directly	   constitutional	   rights	   rules	   to	   private	  
relationships.	  What	  a	  judge	  could	  do	  instead	  is	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  unconstitutionality	  
before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court11.	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  majority	  position	  the	  role	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Court	  should	  be	  to	  
protect	  individuals	  when	  a	  public	  authority	  has	  undermined	  one	  of	  their	  fundamental	  
rights.	   However,	   these	   Courts	   have	   adopted	   an	   active	   position	   by	   considering	   their	  
actuation	   also	   possible	   when	   the	   judge	   fails	   to	   provide	   adequate	   protection	   to	   an	  
individual	  whose	  right	  has	  been	  infringed	  by	  another	  private	  party.	  We	  refer	  to	  a	  right	  
with	  constitutional	  significance.	  However,	  this	  action	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  could	  
be	  only	  justified	  when	  the	  judge	  had	  ignored	  absolutely	  the	  protection	  guaranteed	  by	  
fundamental	  rights.	  In	  this	  point,	  some	  Spanish	  scholars	  believe	  that	  the	  function	  of	  the	  
judge	  is	  to	  channel	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  general	  clauses,	  which	  
are	  undetermined	  concepts	  of	  the	  positive	  law,	  to	  a	  particular	  case.	  If	  the	  court	  fails	  to	  
do	  so,	  they	  will	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  caused	  an	  infringement12.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Nevertheless,	  both	  approaches	  to	  the	  Drittwikung	  theorie	  coincide	  in	  affirming	  that	  nobody	  could	  be	  
obliged	  to	  organize	  his	  life	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  constitutional	  principles.	  This	  is	  expression	  of	  the	  right	  
to	  individual	  self-­‐determination.	  BILBAO	  UBILLOS,	  362	  
10	  SALVADOR	  CODERCH,	  Pablo	  and	  FERRER	  I	  RIBA,	  Josep,	  en	  Asociaciones,	  derechos	  fundamentales…	  p.93.	  
11	  SALVADOR	  CODERCH,	  Pablo	  and	  FERRER	  I	  RIBA,	  Josep,	  en	  Asociaciones,	  derechos	  fundamentales…	  p.96.	  
12	  The	  general	  clause	  is	  a	  mechanism	  used	  by	  the	  legislator	  to	  allow	  the	  judge	  to	  build	  the	  norm	  to	  be	  
applied	  to	  the	  specific	  case.	  MIQUEL	  GONZALEZ	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In	   conclusion	   the	  majority	   of	   scholars	   believe	   that	   a	   direct	   horizontal	   application	   of	  
fundamental	  rights	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  individuals	  is	  not	  possible.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  
while	   the	   State	   cannot	   infringe	   the	   equality	   right,	   individuals	   can	   be	   married	   in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  religious	  beliefs,	  or	  make	  a	  last	  will	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  sexual	  
preferences	  or	  become	  members	  of	  one	  political	  party	  and	  not	  another.	  	  However,	  even	  
those	  scholars	  believe	  that	  an	  indirect	  application	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  is	  possible	  
in	  some	  cases,	  and	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  rights	   in	  the	  private	  sphere	  are	  different	  
depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   private	   relationship	   affected.	   	   In	   fact,	   while	   labour	   and	  
consumer	  laws	  are	  areas	  where	  fundamental	  rights	  have	  a	  clear	  impact,	  in	  other	  cases	  
their	  influence	  is	  poor	  (e.g.:	  right	  to	  marry).	  Moreover,	  we	  must	  underline	  that	  usually	  
the	  more	  socially	  powerful	  that	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  relationship	  is,	  the	  stronger	  
effect	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  over	  such	  a	  relationship.	  
-­   Should	  this	  matter	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  collision	  between	  rights	  or	  as	  an	  abuse	  of	  
right?	  
In	  order	  to	  set	  out	  a	  rule	  to	  channel	  these	  types	  of	  conflicts	  between	  individuals,	  part	  of	  
the	  doctrine	  affirms	   that	   the	   limit	   to	   the	  private	  autonomy	   is	  not	   the	   respect	  of	   the	  
equality	  principle	  but	  the	  respect	  of	  human	  dignity.	  Therefore,	  only	  when	  a	  behaviour	  
is	  contrary	  to	  the	  dignity	  of	  a	  person,	  in	  other	  words	  when	  it	  involves	  a	  vexatious	  conduct	  
against	  other	  person,	  could	  it	  be	  deemed	  as	  a	  discriminatory	  one.	  Since	  this	  doctrine	  
proposes	  to	  address	  this	  type	  of	  problem	  as	  a	  case	  of	  abuse	  of	  right,	  the	  conduit	   for	  
challenging	  this	  discriminatory	  act	  would	  be	  article	  7.2	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  Code13.	  
These	  authors	  believe	  that	  these	  groups	  of	  cases	  could	  be	  analysed	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  human	  dignity.	  We	  refer	  to	  such	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  renunciation	  undermines	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   ALFARO,	   Jesús,	   “Autonomía	   privada	   y	   derechos	   fundamentales”	   ADC,	   1993-­‐I	   p.71.	   and	   PRIETO,	  
Derechos	  fundamentales,	  p.217.	  He	  proposes	  to	  analyze	  the	  following	  case	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  
abuse	  of	  right:	  If	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  discotheque	  or	  a	  bar	  deny	  access	  to	  a	  person	  due	  to	  his	  race,	  the	  judge	  
could	   apply	   the	   article	   7.2	   CC,	   which	   from	   a	   constitutional	   interpretation	   prohibit	   such	   degrading	  
behavior,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  person.	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human	  dignity.	  They	  think	  that	  these	  problems	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  collision	  between	  
the	  private	  autonomy	  and	  the	  right	  to	  dignity14.	  	  
Article	  10	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitution	  refers	  to	  dignity,	  in	  fact	  all	  human	  rights	  derive	  
from	   the	   dignity	   and	  worth	   inherent	   in	   the	   person	   as	   stated	   by	   the	   decision	   of	   the	  
Spanish	   Constitutional	   Court	   of	   11of	  April	   (STC	   53/1985).	  Human	  dignity	   implies	   the	  
right	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   decide	   freely	   and	   consciously	   his	   way	   of	   life,	   and	   to	   be	  
respected	  by	  others.	  Therefore,	   it	  cannot	  be	  renounced,	  or	  be	  the	  object	  of	  disposal,	  
and	  has	  to	  be	  always	  respected	  by	  the	  Law15.	  
As	  such,	  this	  degrading	  or	  vexatious	  behaviour	  that	  consists	  of	  treating	  a	  person	  as	  if	  he	  
were	  not	  a	  human	  being	  cannot	  be	  permitted16.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  we	  could	  compare	  the	  
situation	  of	  a	  majority	  who	  by	  a	  vexatious	  behaviour	  refuses	  to	  contract	  with	  a	  minority,	  
with	  the	  situation	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  monopolistic	  situation	  who	  refuses	  to	  contract	  
with	   another	   person.	   It	   has	   been	   said	   that	   the	   person	   rejected	   lacks	   a	   reasonable	  
alternative	  to	  recover	  the	  social	  status	  that	  the	  rejection	  provokes17.	  Let	  us	  think	  about	  
the	  available	  alternatives	  of	  the	  black	  population	  when	  the	  white	  establish	  an	  apartheid	  
regime.	  
These	  scholars	  conclude	  that,	  as	  a	  rule,	   in	  the	  private	  sphere	  it	   is	   licit	  to	  discriminate	  
against	  anyone,	  because	  it	  is	  licit	  to	  choose	  the	  person	  to	  contract	  with.	  The	  problem	  
arises	  when	  the	  refusal	  to	  contract	  affects	  a	  fundamental	  right	  that	  can	  be	  undermined.	  
In	   fact,	   normally	   we	   have	   to	   decide	   which	   right	   should	   be	   prioritized	   in	   a	   collision	  
between	  two	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  
Notwithstanding,	  sometimes	  a	  discriminatory	  act	  which	  could	  affect	  the	  dignity	  of	  one	  
of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  could	  be	  justified	  by	  another	  right,	  for	  example	  the	  right	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitution:	  	  The	  dignity	  of	  the	  person,	  the	  inviolable	  rights	  which	  are	  
inherent,	  the	  free	  develop-­‐	  ment	  of	  the	  personality,	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  law	  and	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  
are	  the	  foundation	  of	  political	  order	  and	  social	  peace.	  	  
15	  María	  Merino	  Norverto,	  “Sípnosis	  del	  artículo	  10	  CE”.	  
	  http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/sinopsis/sinopsis.jsp?art=10&tipo=2	  
See	  SSTC	  120/1990,	  of	  27	  of	  June,	  	  57/1994,	  of	  28	  of	  February,	  242/	  1994,	  of	  20	  of	  June,	  107/1984,	  of	  23	  
of	  November	  and	  99/1985,	  of	  30	  of	  September.	  
16	  ALFARO,	  Jesús,	  “Autonomía…”,	  p.	  107-­‐108	  
17	  ALFARO,	  Jesús,	  “Autonomía…”	  p.113	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privacy	   could	   justify	   not	   entering	   into	   a	   contract	  with	   a	   person	   of	   different	   gender.	  
Finally,	   we	   should	   analyse	   a	   particular	   case	   to	   decide	   if	   a	   discriminatory	   behaviour	  
should	  be	  considered	  wrong.	  What	  we	  have	  laid	  out	  are	  the	  tools	  to	  realize	  such	  analysis,	  
but	  these	  tools	  can	  only	  be	  used	  when	  the	  collision	  happens.	  
I	  disagree	  with	  the	  above	  mentioned	  scholars’	  opinion	  for	  different	  reasons.	  First,	  I	  do	  
not	  think	  that	  this	  matter	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  case	  of	  abuse	  of	  law.	  In	  fact,	  in	  these	  types	  
of	  cases	  there	  are	  conflicts	  between	  two	  different	  fundamental	  rights,	  or	  the	  equality	  
principle	  and	  a	   fundamental	   right,	  and	  after	  weighing	  the	  circumstances	   it	  should	  be	  
decided	   to	   give	   priority	   to	   one	   of	   them	   over	   the	   other.	   Secondly,	   the	   same	   type	   of	  
conduct	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  vexatious	  one	  or	  not	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  circumstances	  
involved.	  For	  example,	  the	  dismissal	  of	  an	  employee	  due	  to	  his	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  
free	  speech	  is	  surely	  contrary	  to	  his	  dignity,	  but	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  the	  right	  to	  religion	  
or	  the	  right	  to	  create	  private	  educational	  establishments	  with	  “centre-­‐wide	  ideology”.	  
Finally,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  respect	  to	  the	  human’s	  dignity	  is	  reflected	  in	  all	  the	  
fundamental	  rights,	  the	  approach	  referred	  to	  above	  is	  wrong.	  The	  dignity	  is	  too	  nebulous	  
a	  concept	  to	  be	  used	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  a	  theoretical	  construct.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  extremely	  
difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  a	  behaviour	  that	  goes	  against	  the	  dignity	  of	  a	  person	  and	  
one	  that	  does	  not.	  It	  is	  too	  difficult	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  principle	  of	  dignity	  is,	  or	  the	  
limits	  that	  this	  principle	  imposes.	  A	  better	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  focus	  the	  study	  on	  the	  
concept	  of	  equality,	  which	  has	  been	  examined	  in	  depth	  by	  the	  scholars.	  
Therefore,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  not	  correct	  to	  use	  the	  abuse	  of	  a	  right	  as	  a	  key	  to	  study	  this	  
matter.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  find	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  private	  autonomy	  it	  is	  not	  article	  7.2	  
SCC	  we	  should	  look	  at,	  but	  articles	  1255	  and	  6.2	  SCC	  which	  refer	  to	  public	  order	  and	  
morality	  as	  borderlines	  of	  the	  human	  conduct.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  problem	  of	  
limits	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  private	  autonomy,	  but	  a	  problem	  to	  decide	  which	  one	  of	  two	  
fundamental	  rights	  prevails	  in	  case	  of	  collision.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  judge	  should	  be	  to	  
weigh	  the	  two	  rights	  in	  conflict.	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Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  the	  Spanish	  Constitutional	  Court	  can	  only	  act	  when	  the	  judge	  does	  not	  
protect	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   a	   discriminated	   person18.	   Nevertheless,	   there	   are	  
different	  possible	  constitutional	  interpretations	  of	  the	  law;	  therefore,	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court	   should	   respect	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   judge	   which	   has	   a	   possible	   constitutional	  
meaning..	  As	  we	  pointed	  out	  previously,	  in	  a	  case	  where	  a	  judge	  believes	  that	  the	  law	  to	  
be	  applied	  to	  a	  specific	  case	  is	  contrary	  to	  a	  fundamental	  law,	  he	  should	  bring	  an	  action	  
of	  unconstitutionally	  before	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  
-­   Effects	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals	  
Analyzing	   the	   problem,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   next	   step	   is	   to	   evaluate	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
fundamental	  rights	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals.	  We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  
two	  types	  of	  cases.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  freedom	  to	  negotiate	  and	  decide	  
the	  content	  of	  a	  contract,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  to	  the	  right	  to	  contract.	  	  
The	  first	  category	  confronts	  private	  autonomy	  with	  a	  specific	  fundamental	  right.	  We	  can	  
approach	  this	  by	  studying	  a	  specific	  case.	  Could	  a	  prohibition	  on	  being	  married	  imposed	  
on	  a	  tenant	  in	  a	  lease	  contract	  be	  constitutional?	  The	  Spanish	  doctrine	  underlines	  that	  
it	  would	  not	  be	  an	  absolute	  prohibition	  established	  by	  the	  authority19,	  but	  a	  condition	  
freely	  negotiated	  by	  the	  parties.	  In	  fact,	  the	  tenant	  could	  be	  married	  whenever	  he	  wants,	  
but	  in	  such	  a	  case	  he	  should	  lease	  another	  dwelling.	  Therefore,	  in	  that	  case	  such	  a	  clause	  
would	   be	   lawful	   and	  would	   not	   be	   considered	   as	   source	   of	  wrongful	   discrimination.	  
Consequently,	  what	  must	  be	  studied	  in	  this	  type	  of	  cases	  is	  whether	  the	  renunciation	  of	  
a	  right	  in	  a	  specific	  case	  is	  acceptable	  or	  not;	  this	  means	  that	  we	  must	  look	  for	  a	  solution	  
to	  a	  particular	  case,	  but	  not	  a	  general	  or	  abstract	  rule.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  second	  category	  refers	  to	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  the	  other	  contractual	  party.	  When	  one	  
party	   is	   in	   a	  monopolistic	   situation,	   when	   the	   other	   contractual	   party	   has	   no	   other	  
alternative,	  when	   there	   are	   no	   competitors	  who	  offer	   a	   similar	   service	   or	   good,	   the	  
refusal	  to	  contract	  is	  not	  an	  option.	  Therefore,	  contractual	  freedom	  does	  not	  work,	  and	  
this	  limitation	  should	  be	  corrected	  by	  the	  public	  powers.	  	  If	  the	  judge	  does	  not	  do	  so,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   ALFARO,	   Jesús,	   “Autonomía	   privada	   y	   derechos	   fundamentales”	   ADC,	   1993-­‐I	   p.71.	   and	   PRIETO,	  
Derechos	  fundamentales,	  p.217.	  See	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitutional	  Court	  STC	  55/83.	  
19	  ALFARO,	  Jesús,	  “Autonomía…”	  p.94.	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writ	   of	   “amparo”	   could	   take	   place	   before	   the	   Constitutional	   Court.	   If	   there	   is	   not	   a	  
monopolistic	   situation,	   any	   contracting	   party	   is	   free	   to	   contract	   with	   another	  
competitor.	   Therefore,	   his	   fundamental	   rights	  would	   not	   be	   affected	   by	   a	   limitation	  
imposed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  offerors.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  public	  order	  sets	  up	  other	  
controls.	  For	   instance,	  a	  contract	   in	  which	  one	  of	   the	  parties	  accepts	   to	  be	  sold	   into	  
slavery	  would	  not	  be	  protected	  by	  law.	  	  
Another	   approach	   is	   possible	   if	   we	   study	   the	   right	   to	   admission	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
associations.	  When	   the	   law	   is	   silent,	   and	  a	  monopoly	   situation	   is	   not	  present,	   is	   the	  
association	   free	   to	   decide	  who	   is	   going	   to	   be	   accepted	   as	   a	   new	  member?	   Karsten	  
Schmidt	  emphasises	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case	  it	  is	  important	  to	  value	  the	  economic	  or	  social	  
function	  of	  the	  society20.	  This	  can	  be	  also	  applied	  in	  case	  of	  the	  expulsion	  of	  a	  member	  
when	  the	  association	  is	  not	  in	  a	  monopoly	  situation.	  This	  case	  was	  studied	  by	  judgment	  
96/1994	  of	   the	   Spanish	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	  which	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   the	   judge	   can	  
review	  the	  decision	  to	  expel	  a	  member	  of	  an	  association	  when	  such	  an	  expulsion	  may	  
cause	  a	  significant	  economic	  damage	  to	  the	  associate.	  In	  this	  case	  there	  was	  a	  direct	  link	  
between	   the	   expulsion	   and	   the	   damage	   suffered	   by	   the	   member	   due	   to	   economic	  
interests	  linked	  to	  the	  legal	  relationship	  existing	  between	  associate	  and	  association21.	  
This	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  February	  8th	  2001,	  in	  
which	  the	  decision	  of	  an	  association	  of	  fishermen	  to	  reject	  the	  admission	  of	  two	  women	  
as	  members	  of	  the	  association	  due	  to	  their	  gender,	  was	  considered	  discriminatory	  and	  
unacceptable.	  It	  was	  underlined	  that	  in	  fact	  they	  were	  being	  prevented	  access	  to	  a	  job22.	  	  
Finally,	  we	  refer	  to	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  private	  relationships	  in	  which	  the	  State	  has	  decided	  
to	  intervene	  in	  order	  to	  regulate	  the	  limits	  of	  private	  autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  right	  
to	  discriminate.	   The	   first	   European	   statute	  which	   could	  be	  assimilated	   to	   the	  North-­‐
American	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  was	  the	  Directive	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  2000/78,	  of	  
November	   27	   which	   established	   a	   general	   framework	   for	   equal	   treatment	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  KARSTEN	  SCHMIDT,	  Gesellschaftstrecht,	  Karl	  Heymaanns,	  Köln,	  Berlin,	  Bonn,	  München,	  1991,	  p.592	  	  
21	  CODERCH,	  Salvador,	  FERRER	  I	  RIBA,	  Josep,	  Asociaciones…	  pp.	  71-­‐72.	  
22	   Judgment	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Supreme	  Court	   of	   8	   of	   February	   of	   2001.	   (RJ	   2001\544)	   Reporting	   judge:	  
Ignacio	  Sierra	  Gil	  de	  la	  Cuesta	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employment	   and	   occupation.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   the	   Racial	   Equality	   Directive	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  regulation	  2000/43	  was	  adopted	  on	  the	  29th	  of	  June.	  
The	  transposition	  of	   the	  former	  Directive	  to	  the	  Spanish	  Law	  was	  made	  through	  two	  
different	   statutes:	   law	   51	   of	   December	   2,	   of	   2003	   on	   equal	   opportunities,	   non-­‐
discrimination,	  and	  universal	  access	  of	  people	  with	  disabilities,	   (now	  Royal	   legislative	  
Decree	  1/2013	  of	  29	  of	  November,	  that	  rules	  the	  Consolidates	  Text	  of	  the	  General	  Law	  
on	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  with	  disabilities	  and	  their	  social	  inclusion)	  and	  law	  62	  of	  30	  of	  
December	  of	  2003	  on	  fiscal	  measures,	  administrative	  measures	  and	  measures	  of	  a	  social	  
nature	  which	  cover	  all	  grounds	  of	  both	  referred	  directives.	  	  	  	  
Article	  27	  of	   law	  62/2003	  states	  that	   the	  norms	  of	   its	  chapter	   III	   (arts.	  27-­‐43)	  will	  be	  
applied	  to	  any	  individual	  both	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  Articles	  29-­‐33	  lay	  out	  in	  
detail	   the	   equal	   treatment	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	  measures	   regarding	   the	   racial	   or	  
ethnic	  origin	  of	  the	  individual.	  This	  section	  aims	  to	  establish	  measures	  to	  guarantee	  that	  
this	  type	  of	  discrimination	  will	  not	  take	  place	  in	  the	  education,	  health	  and	  social	  services	  
sectors,	  housing,	  and	  in	  general;	  access	  to	  any	  good	  or	  service.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  
regulation	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  pragmatic,	  because	  in	  spite	  of	  	  the	  prohibition	  of	  any	  
discrimination	  regarding	  housing	  and	  access	   to	  any	  good	  or	  service,	   there	   is	  no	   legal	  
sanction	  for	  any	  violation	  of	  this	  prohibition23.	  
Finally,	   articles	   34-­‐43	   (Section	   3)	   rule	   the	   prohibition	   of	   employment	   discrimination.	  
Which	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	   similar	  article	   to	   the	  one	   included	   in	   the	  “commercial	  
discrimination”	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   Article	   34.2	   states	   that	   any	   direct	   or	   indirect	  
employment	   discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   racial	   or	   ethnic	   origin,	   religion	   or	  
convictions,	  disability,	  age	  or	  person’s	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  prohibited.	  
Another	   important	   Spanish	   regulation	   is	   the	   Equality	   Law	   (Ley	   Orgánica	   3/2007)	   of	  
March	  22,	  2007.	  This	  matter	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  case	  in	  which	  the	  refusal	  to	  contract	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  Project	  of	  comprehensive	  Law	  on	  equal	   treatment	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  of	  3	  of	   June	  of	  2011	  
tried	  to	  solve	  this	  lack	  of	  remedies,	  but	  finally	  was	  not	  adopted.	  See	  AGUILERA	  RULL,	  Ariadna,	  “El	  proyecto	  





could	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  dignity	  of	  an	  individual.	  We	  analyze	  now	  which	  
cases	  we	  are	  referring	  to,	  and	  what	  reasons	  could	  justify	  such	  a	  behavior.	  
This	   is	   an	   area	   where	   Council	   Directive	   2004/113/EC	   of	   December	   13,	   2004,	  
implemented	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  treatment	  between	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  access	  
to	  goods	  and	  services24.	  	  
The	  preamble	  of	  this	  Directive	  explains	  that	  differences	  in	  treatment	  could	  be	  accepted	  
when	   they	   would	   be	   justified	   by	   a	   legitimate	   claim.	   Precisely,	   this	   legitimate	   claim	  
normally	   comprises	   the	   exercise	   of	   a	   fundamental	   right	   that	   justifies	   this	   type	   of	  
conduct.	  The	  Directive	  offers	  some	  examples:	  the	  protection	  of	  victims	  of	  sex-­‐related	  
violence	  (in	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  single-­‐	  sex	  shelters),	  reasons	  of	  privacy	  
and	  decency	  (in	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  accommodation	  by	  a	  person	  in	  a	  part	  of	  
that	  person's	  home),	   the	  promotion	  of	  gender	  equality	  or	  of	   the	   interests	  of	  men	  or	  
women	  (for	  example	  single-­‐sex	  voluntary	  bodies),	  the	  freedom	  of	  association	  (in	  cases	  
of	  membership	  of	  single-­‐sex	  private	  clubs),	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  sporting	  activities	  
(for	  example	  single-­‐sex	  sports	  events)25.	  	  
The	  Directive	   is	   also	   valuable	   because	   it	   establishes	   an	   important	   rule	   to	   distinguish	  
between	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  decisions	  when	  selecting	  the	  contracting	  party.	  
It	   says	   that	   the	   Directive	   does	   not	   prejudice	   the	   individual's	   freedom	   to	   choose	   a	  
contractual	  partner	  as	  long	  as	  an	  individual's	  choice	  of	  contractual	  partner	  is	  not	  based	  
on	   that	   person's	   sex	   (art.3).	   Therefore,	   it	   considers	   that	   when	   the	   choice	   is	   based	  
exclusively	  on	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  candidate,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  deemed	  as	  discriminatory.	  This	  rule	  
should	  be	   applied	   to	   any	   contract	   concerning	   the	   access	   to	   goods	   and	   services.	   It	   is	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  In	  addition,	  we	  can	  refer	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  rules	  of	  the	  Draft	  Common	  Frame	  of	  Reference	  (DCFR)	  
of	  the	  Principles,	  Definitions	  and	  Model	  Rules	  of	  European	  Private	  Law,	  which	  article	  II.	  2.101	  says:	  “not	  
to	  be	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sex	  or	  ethnic	  or	  racial	  origin	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  contract	  or	  other	  
judicial	  act	  the	  object	  of	  which	  is	  to	  provide	  Access	  to,	  or	  supply,	  goods,	  other	  assets	  or	  services	  which	  are	  
available	  to	  the	  public”.	  
25	  The	  Directive	  adds	  that	  any	  limitation	  should	  nevertheless	  be	  appropriate	  and	  necessary	  in	  accordance	  
with	  the	  criteria	  derived	  from	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Communities.	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blatantly	  obvious	  that	  the	  law	  considers	  that	  those	  behaviors	  would	  violate	  the	  dignity	  
of	  the	  women	  involved26.	  
Moreover,	  the	  Directive	  provides	  that	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  a	  system	  to	  ensure	  
“real	  and	  effective	  compensation	  or	  reparation	  for	  the	  loss	  and	  damage	  sustained	  by	  a	  
person	  injured	  as	  a	  result	  of	  discrimination	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Directive,	  in	  a	  way	  
which	  is	  dissuasive	  and	  proportionate	  to	  the	  damage	  suffered.	  The	  fixing	  of	  a	  prior	  upper	  
limit	  shall	  not	  restrict	  such	  compensation	  or	  reparation”.	  	  The	  word	  “dissuasive”	  could	  
easily	  create	  unnecessary	  confusion,	  given	  that	  it	  sounds	  like	  “punitive	  damages”	  (art.8),	  
and	  the	  Directive	  prohibits	  the	  State	  to	  establish	  a	  limit	  (art.	  8.2)	  27.	  It	  is	  added	  by	  article	  
9	   that	   it	   shall	   be	   for	   the	   respondent	   to	  prove	   that	   there	  has	  been	  no	  breach	  of	   the	  
principle	  of	  equal	  treatment.	  	  
The	  Spanish	  Equality	  Law	  (Ley	  Orgánica	  3/2007)	  of	  22	  of	  March	  of	  2007	  reproduces	  the	  
principle	  of	  article	  3	  of	   the	  Directive	   in	   its	  article	  69.	  Therefore,	   this	  article	  prohibits	  
discrimination	  based	  on	  the	  person’s	  sex	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  access	  to	  and	  supply	  of	  goods	  
and	  services.	  
This	   regulation	   reflects	   the	  work	   of	   the	   State	   as	   a	  mediator.	   The	   State	   is	   obliged	   to	  
guarantee	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  to	  respect	  the	  private	  autonomy.	  Consequently,	  the	  
best	  way	  to	  comply	  with	  this	  double	  function	  is	  to	  regulate	  norms	  where	  these	  limits	  are	  
set	  out.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  other	  cases	  of	  possible	  discrimination	  not	  regulated	  directly	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Nevertheless,	  the	  article	  4	  of	  the	  Directive	  adds	  that	  it	  shall	  not	  preclude	  differences	  in	  treatment,	  if	  
the	  provision	  of	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  exclusively	  or	  primarily	  to	  members	  of	  one	  sex	  is	  justified	  by	  a	  
legitimate	  aim	  and	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  that	  aim	  are	  appropriate	  and	  necessary.	  
In	  opinion	  of	  GARCIA	  RUBIO,	  the	  article	  13	  of	  the	  Directive	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  
is	  also	  prohibited	  any	  discriminatory	  clause	   included	  in	  contracts	  made	  individually	  by	  companies	  with	  
clients	  concerning	  the	  the	  access	  to	  and	  supply	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  (“Discriminación	  por	  razón	  de	  sexo	  
y	  derecho	  contractual	  en	  la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  3/2007,	  de	  22	  de	  marzo,	  para	  la	  igualdad	  efectiva	  de	  mujeres	  y	  
hombre”,	  Derecho	   Privado	   y	   Constitución,	   nº21,	   enero-­‐diciembre,	   2007,	   p.135.	   If	   fact	   any	   supplier	   of	  
goods	  of	  services	  which	  is	  not	  a	  consumer	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  Directive	  as	  said	  STORE	  F.	  “Comments	  on	  the	  
Draft	  of	  the	  New	  	  German	  Private	  Law	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act”,	  GLJ,	  vol.	  6,	  nº2,	  February	  2005,	  pp.	  533-­‐
548,	  www.germanlawjournal.com	  search	  Anti-­‐Discrimination*	  (GARCIA-­‐RUBIO	  p.134).	  
27	   The	   Spanish	   Law	   solves	   this	   problem	   by	   introducing	   a	   new	   element,	   “the	   sanction”.	   Therefore,	  
distinguish	  between	   the	  damages,	   that	  will	  be	  always	  proportionate	   to	   the	  damage	   suffered,	  and	   the	  
sanction,	  that	  will	  be	  dissuasive	  (art.10	  LO	  3/2007).	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a	   specific	   law,	   we	   should	   apply	   the	   criteria	   abovementioned,	   and	   the	   Court	   should	  
decide	  in	  light	  of	  the	  concurrent	  circumstances28.	  
	  
2-­‐	  NORTHAMERICAN	  BACKGROUND	  
The	  original	  text	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  include	  any	  reference	  
to	   human	   equality.	   In	   fact,	   some	   of	   the	   founding	   fathers	   had	   slaves	   and	   ruled	   their	  
families	  as	  patriarchs.	  	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  American	  civil	  war,	  in	  1868,	  that	  Amendment	  
XIV	  was	   adopted,	  which	   stated	   that:	   “…nor	   deny	   any	   State	   to	   any	   person	  within	   its	  
jurisdiction	  the	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  laws”.	  This	  meant	  a	  first	  and	  crucial	  step	  in	  the	  
fight	  against	  racism29.	  	  
The	  American	  Supreme	  Court	  stated	  in	  Barbier	  v.	  Cannolly	  112	  US	  27,	  30-­‐32,	  1885,	  that	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  XIV	  Amendment	  “equal	  protection	  and	  security	  should	  be	  given	  
to	   all	   under	   like	   circumstances	   in	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   their	   personal	   and	   civil	   rights”.	  
Moreover,	   it	   was	   interpreted	   in	   1920	   as	   following:	   “The	   classification	   must	   be	  
reasonable,	  not	  arbitrary,	  and	  must	  rest	  upon	  some	  ground	  of	  difference	  having	  a	  fair	  
and	   substantial	   relation	   to	   the	   object	   of	   the	   legislation,	   so	   that	   all	   persons	   similarly	  
circumstanced	  shall	  be	  treated	  alike”	  (F.S.	  Royster	  Guano	  Co.	  v.	  Virginia	  253	  US,	  412,	  
415,	  1920).	  What	  has	  been	  object	  of	  doctrinal	  debate	   is	   the	   interpretation	  of	   this	  so	  
called	  “Aristotelian	  approach”,	  because	  treating	  people	  differently	  when	  they	  are	  not	  in	  
the	  same	  circumstances	  could	  be	  the	  perfect	  justification	  to	  perpetuate	  discrimination,	  
when	  those	  discriminated	  against	  do	  not	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  improve	  their	  status.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  To	  end	  this	  study	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Law	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  an	  important	  distinction	  usually	  commented	  by	  
the	  Spanish	  scholars.	  This	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  cases	  of	  direct	  and	  indirect	  discrimination.	  It	  has	  been	  
observed	  that	  while	  the	  former	  are	  easily	  identifiable	  cases,	  the	  latter	  not.	  If	  an	  association	  decides	  to	  
deny	  access	  to	  the	  individuals	  of	  a	  particular	  race,	  the	  discriminatory	  situation	  is	  easily	  appreciable,	  but	  if	  
the	  landlord	  decides	  not	  to	  accept	  tenants	  with	  a	  part-­‐time	  work,	  the	  discrimination	  may	  be	  ignored.	  The	  
Spanish	  scholars	  affirm	  that	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  the	  persons	  with	  part-­‐time	  contracts	  are	  women,	  
it	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  indirect	  way	  to	  discriminate	  against	  them.	  AGUILERA	  RULL,	  “Discriminación	  
directa	   e	   indirecta”	   InDret,	   nº	   396,	   enero	   2007.	   www.indret.com.	   GARCÍA	   RUBIO,	   María	   Paz,	  
“Discriminación…”	  p.	  139.	  
29	  Two	  years	  earlier	  the	  Federal	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1866	  prohibited	  any	  type	  of	  racial	  discrimination	   in	  
independent	  contractor	  relations	  and	  bars	  businesses	  which	  were	  considered	  as	  public	  accommodations	  
from	   discriminating	   against	   customers.	   HAGGARD,	   Thomas	   R.,	   Understanding	   Employment	  
Discrimination,	  Lexis-­‐Nexis,	  	  3-­‐11	  (2001).	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The	  right	  to	  equality	  established	  by	  the	  XIV	  Amendment	  is	  addressed	  to	  the	  States,	  this	  
means	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   protect	   individuals	   from	   discriminatory	   acts	   of	   the	   public	  
authorities,	  not	  to	  rule	  the	  private	  relations	  between	  individuals.	  This	  was	  stated	  by	  the	  
American	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Harris,	  106	  US	  629	  (1883).	  However,	  this	  
Court	  decided	  in	  Shelley	  v.	  Kraemer,	  334,	  US	  1	  (1948)	  that	  private	  racism	  could	  happen,	  
but	  the	  courts	  could	  not	  constitutionally	  enforce	  it.	  At	  issue	  was	  not	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  
racist	   private	   agreement,	   but	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   judicial	   enforcement	   of	   those	  
agreements.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  States	  cannot	  grant	  judicial	  enforcement	  
to	   these	   discriminatory	   agreements	   without	   denying	   the	   petitioners	   the	   equal	  
protection	   of	   the	   laws.	   The	   facts	   of	   this	   case	   were	   that	   an	   African-­‐American	   family	  
bought	  a	  residential	  property,	  but	  when	  they	  occupied	  it,	  they	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  
property	  owners	  of	  the	  residential	  complex	  had	  agreed	  by	  a	  covenant	  to	  restrict	  the	  sale	  
and	   occupation	   of	   property	   to	   Caucasians.	   Consequently,	   one	   of	   the	   neighbors,	  Mr.	  
Kraemer	  took	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  black	  family,	  the	  Shelleys,	  before	  the	  state	  court,	  
to	  enforce	  the	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  the	  agreement	  and,	  therefore,	  disposing	  of	  the	  
black	   family.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   racially	   restrictive	   covenants	   not	   being	  
unconstitutional,	   it	   is	  unconstitutional	   for	   judges	   to	  enforce	   them.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  
note	   that,	   in	   this	   case	   the	   American	   Supreme	   Court	   reaches	   a	   similar	   result	   to	   the	  
solutions	  offered	  by	  the	  Spanish	  and	  German	  Constitutional	  Courts	  when	  they	  decided	  
the	   horizontal	   application	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   in	   the	   relationships	   between	  
individuals30.	  
When	  we	  compare	  the	  Constitutions	  of	  these	  countries	  with	  the	  Constitution	  of	  South	  
Africa	  of	  1996,	  we	  realize	  that	  the	  latter	  goes	  even	  further.	  If	  fact	  it	  establishes	  that	  “No	  
person	  may	  unfairly	  discriminate	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  against	  anyone	  on	  one	  or	  more	  
grounds	   in	   term	  of	   subsection	  3.	  National	   legislation	  must	  be	  enacted	   to	  prevent	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  This	  judgment	  produced	  a	  deep	  impact	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  American	  Jurisprudence.	  Only	  a	  few	  years	  
before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  decided	  that	   this	   type	  of	  covenants	  no	  contained	  state	  action	  because	  
were	  made	  in	  the	  private	  sphere.	  Corrigan	  v.	  Buckley,	  271,	  US	  323	  (1926).	  Equally,	  the	  1943	  Restatement	  
of	  Property	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  public	  order.	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prohibit	  unfair	  discrimination”	  (Chapter	  2	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  Art.9)31.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  
of	  the	  majority	  doctrine	  this	  statement	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	  private	  
autonomy	  principle,	  but	  the	  word	  “unfair”	  could	  give	  significance	  to	   its	  content.	  This	  
could	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   in	  private	  relationships	   it	   is	   legal	  to	   lead	  to	  an	  
unequal	   treatment	   with	   the	   only	   exception	   of	   being	   unfair.	   This	   could	   be	   easily	  
connected	  with	  behaviors	  that	  violate	  the	  dignity	  of	  a	  person,	  or	  that	  impede	  his	  access	  
to	  a	  service	  or	  good	  (cases	  of	  monopoly)	  or	  provoke	  a	  severe	  economic	  damage.	  
Turning	  to	  the	  American	  Law,	  in	  Palmore	  v.	  Sidoni,	  466	  US	  429	  (1984)	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
again	  stated	  that	  private	  biases	  may	  be	  outside	  the	  reach	  of	  law,	  but	  the	  law	  cannot,	  
directly	  or	  indirectly,	  gave	  them	  effect32.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  fact	  a	  white	  
mother	  had	  as	  a	  partner	  an	  African-­‐American,	  was	  enough	  reason	  to	  deprive	  her	  of	  the	  
custody	  of	  her	  white	  daughter.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  further	  on.	  
The	   next	   milestone	   in	   the	   movement	   for	   equality	   in	   the	   United	   States	   was	   when	  
Congress	  passed	  the	  Civil	  right	  Act	  of	  1964,	  which	  stated	  in	  Title	  VII	  that	  it	  would	  be	  an	  
unlawful	  employment	  practice	  for	  an	  employer:	  (Sec.	  703)	  to	  fail	  or	  refuse	  to	  hire	  or	  to	  
discharge	  any	  individual,	  or	  otherwise	  to	  discriminate	  against	  any	  individual	  with	  respect	  
to	  this	  compensation,	  terms,	  conditions,	  or	  privileges	  of	  employment,	  because	  of	  such	  
individual’s	  race	  color,	  religion,	  sex,	  or	  national	  origin;	  or	  2)	  to	  limit,	  segregate,	  or	  classify	  
his	  employees	  or	  applicants	  for	  employment	  in	  any	  way	  which	  would	  deprive	  or	  tend	  to	  
deprive	  any	  individual	  or	  employment	  opportunities	  or	  otherwise	  adversely	  affect	  his	  
status	  as	  an	  employee,	  because	  of	  such	  individual’s	  race,	  color,	  religion,	  sex,	  or	  national	  
origin.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	   this	   regulation	   includes	   the	  
relations	  between	  employer	  and	  employees,	   this	   is	   the	  relations	  between	   individuals	  
acting	  privately.	  After	  amendments	   in	  1972	   it	  covers	  also	  all	  government	  employees.	  
We	  must	  underline	  that	  the	  Section	  703	  does	  not	  protect	  against	  unjust	  discrimination	  
due	   to	   sexual	   orientation.	   However,	   although	   federal	   law	   does	   not	   yet	   prohibit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	   Susection	   3,	   art.9,	   Chapter	   2:	   The	   state	  may	   not	   unfairly	   discriminate	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   against	  
anyone	  on	  one	  or	  more	  grounds,	  including	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  pregnancy,	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  social	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  orientation,	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employment	  discrimination	  on	  this	  basis,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  state	  and	  local	  statutes	  
that	  do	  so.	  
Moreover,	  American	  scholars	  refer	  to	  an	  indirect	  class	  of	  discrimination,	  they	  normally	  
name	   it	   “disparate	   impact”;	   which	   should	   be	   distinguished	   from	   the	   direct	  
discrimination	  or	  facial	  one.	  It	  is	  also	  underlined	  that	  while	  in	  cases	  of	  “disparate	  impact”	  	  
it	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   prove	   the	   intention	   to	   discriminate,	   in	   case	   of	   “disparate	  
treatment”	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  prove	  it33.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  examples	  of	  indirect	  
discrimination	   is	   the	   case	   Yick	   Wo	   v.	   Hopkins,	   118	   US	   at	   359,	   in	   which	   due	   to	   an	  
Ordinance	  of	  San	  Francisco	  all	  the	  people	  of	  Chinese	  heritage	  were	  forbidden	  to	  operate	  
laundries.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Ordinance	  required	  an	  authorization	  to	  operate	  laundries	  in	  all	  the	  
buildings	  of	  the	  city	  but	  the	  stone	  or	  brick	  ones.	  In	  1880	  in	  total	  there	  were	  310	  laundries	  
in	  wooden	  houses,	  240	  of	  these	  were	  owned	  by	  people	  of	  Chinese	  ancestry34.	  	  
Another	  well-­‐know	  discrimination	  case	  is	  Griggs	  v.	  Duke	  Power	  Co	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  
the	   United	   States	   401	   US	   424,	   1971).	   The	   Griggs	   principle	   states	   that	   any	   arbitrary	  
requirement	  established	  by	  the	  employer	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  a	  discriminatory	  preference	  
in	  favor	  of	  a	  social	  group	  is	  not	  acceptable.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  employer	  decided	  to	  require	  
his	   employees	   to	   take	   an	   intelligence	   test	   or	   have	   a	   high	   school	   education.	   These	  
requirements	  were	  not	  linked	  to	  the	  tasks	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  employees.	  However,	  
in	   this	  way	   the	  employer	  ensured	  he	  did	  not	  hire	  black	  people,	  who	  normally	  had	  a	  
worse	   education.	   Neither	   the	   District	   Court	   nor	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   found	   those	  
requirements	  to	  be	  discriminatory,	  as	  they	  did	  not	  see	  a	  clear	  intention	  to	  discriminate,	  
but	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  that	  the	  enactment	  of	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Act	  of	  1964	  had	  to	  be	  
interpreted	   to	   avoid	   artificial	   preferences	   for	   some	   social	   groups,	   and	   against	   other	  
groups35.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  BEERMANN,	  Jack	  M.	  “The	  unhappy	  history	  of	  civil	  rights	  legislation,	  fifty	  years	  after”,	  34	  Conn.	  L.	  Rev.	  
981,	  p.	  1023	  (2002).	  
34	  BERNSTEIN,	  David	  E.	  “Lochner,	  Parity	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Laundry	  Cases”,	  41	  Wm	  &	  Mary	  L.	  Rev.	  211,	  217-­‐
269	  (1999).	  
However,	  in	  Washington	  v.	  Davis	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  required	  the	  discriminatory	  intent	  as	  requirement	  
sine	  qua	  non	  to	  prove	  the	  discrimination.	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  426	  US	  229,	  1976).	  




Moreover,	   the	   1991	   Act	   established	   that	   “Except	   as	   otherwise	   provided	   in	   this	  
subchapter,	   an	   unlawful	   employment	   practice	   is	   established	   when	   the	   complaining	  
party	  demonstrates	  that	  race,	  color,	  religion,	  sex	  or	  national	  origin	  was	  a	  motivation	  for	  
any	  employment	  practice,	  even	  though	  other	  factors	  also	  motivate	  the	  practice”	  (23	  USC	  
§	   2000e-­‐2	   m).	   In	   fact,	   in	   Desert	   Palace,	   Inc	   v.	   Costa	   the	   application	   of	   this	   rule	  
determined	  that	  the	  different	  treatment	  given	  to	  a	  female	  employee	  was	  considered	  
unjustified.	  Two	  workers	  were	  involved	  in	  physical	  altercation,	  one	  of	  them,	  who	  was	  a	  
woman,	  was	  severely	  disciplined,	  the	  other	  one,	  who	  was	  a	  man,	  not.	  Therefore,	  the	  
woman	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  company.	  However,	  it	  was	  alleged	  that	  the	  difference	  
between	  both	  workers	  was	  that	  she	  had	  a	  large	  disciplinary	  record,	  and	  he	  a	  clean	  one.	  
Consequently,	   the	   judge	  was	   instructed	  on	  a	  mixed-­‐motive.	  After	   this	   case,	   could	  be	  
assumed	  that	  a	  plaintiff	  only	  needs	  to	  use	  any	  relevant	  direct	  or	  circumstantial	  evidence	  
of	  one	  of	  the	  discriminatory	  factors	  to	  take	  legal	  actions	  against	  the	  employer36.	  
American	   scholars	   underline	   the	   parallelism	   between	   cases	   of	   employment	  
discrimination,	   which	   are	   contemplated	   by	   the	   law,	   and	   other	   cases	   of	   private	  
discrimination	  that	  theoretically	  are	  permitted	  by	   law,	   in	  spite	  of	  not	  being	  accepted	  
from	   the	  moral	   point	   of	   view.	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   distinguish	   between	  
commercial	  discrimination,	  which	  is	  ruled	  by	  law,	  and	  private	  discrimination,	  which	  is	  
not	  regulated	  by	  law..	  The	  commercial	  discrimination	  comprises	  not	  only	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Act	   of	   1962,	   but	   also	   the	   Federal	   Civil	   Rights	   Act	   of	   1866,	   which	   prohibited	   racial	  
discrimination	   in	   independent	   relationships,	   and	   bar	   business	   considered	   as	   public	  
accommodations	  from	  different	  types	  of	  discrimination	  against	  customers.	  Moreover,	  
the	  States	  have	  ruled	  different	  regulations	  to	  prohibit	  labour	  discrimination.	  Critics	  have	  
pointed	  out	  that	  the	  differences	  between	  so	  called	  “commercial	  discrimination”	  and	  the	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  See	  HARPER,	  Michael	  C.	  “The	  Causation	  Standard	  in	  Federal	  Employment	  Law:	  Gross	  
v.FBL	  Financial	  Services,	  Inc.,	  and	  the	  Unfulfilled	  Promise	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991”,	  
58	  Buff.	  L.	  Rev.	  112-­‐132,	  2010.	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“private	  discrimination”	  are	  not	  justified,	  and	  that	  a	  whole	  regulation	  of	  both	  categories	  
should	  be	  done37.	  
This	  different	  treatment	  could	  be	  founded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  affects	  the	  privacy	  of	  a	  
person,	   his	  more	   intimate	   choices,	   and	   the	   other	   usually	   affects	   economic	   decisions	  
normally	  adopted	  by	  companies.	  In	  addition,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  former	  is	  difficult	  to	  
prove	  and	  the	  latter	  easier,	  due	  to	  the	  number	  of	  persons	  involved	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
such	  decisions	   are	   evidenced	   (for	   example,	   the	  procedure	   to	   hire	   a	   new	  employee).	  
However,	  American	  scholars	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  find	  a	  stronger	  argument	  to	  
justify	   the	   different	   legal	   treatment	   of	   the	   so	   called	   “private”	   and	   “commercial”	  
discrimination.	  
This	  search	  for	  a	  stronger	  argument	  could	  be	  achieved	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  consequences	  
of	  the	  discrimination.	  It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  commercial	  discrimination	  may	  affect	  the	  job	  
a	  person	  needs	  for	  his	  living,	  and	  in	  case	  of	  monopoly	  may	  deprive	  the	  individual’s	  access	  
to	  basic	  goods.	  
We	  could	  consider	  whether	  the	  factor	  behind	  this	  distinction	  is	  the	  social	  impact	  of	  the	  
commercial	   discriminatory	   conducts,	  due	   to	   the	  economic	  or	   social	   damage	   inflicted	  
upon	  the	  victims.	  
However,	   Professor	   Matt	   Zwolinski	   affirms	   that	   the	   value	   of	   autonomy	   is	   not	  
significantly	  greater	  in	  a	  private	  than	  in	  a	  commercial	  context,	  therefore	  he	  thinks	  that	  
we	  should	  not	  appeal	  to	  interests	  in	  autonomy	  to	  justify	  differential	  regulation38.	  Prof.	  
Donald	  A.	  Dripps	  criticizes	  this	  approach.	  He	  afraids	  the	  consequences	  if	  a	  legal	  system	  
would	   be	   to	   attempt	   enforcement	   of	   a	   prohibition	   on	   private	   discrimination.	   He	  
considers	  that	  banning	  private	  discrimination	  as	  a	  symbolic	  matter,	  and	  waiting	  for	  a	  
controversial	   judicial	   nomination	   does	   not	   make	   sense.	   	   He	   concludes	   that	   the	   law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	   Zwolinski,	  Matt,	   “Why	   not	   regulate	   Private	  Discrimination?”,	   43	  San	  Diego	   L.	   Rev.	  
P.1043,	  Fall	  2006.	  
38	  ZWOLINSKI,	  Matt,	  “Why	  not…”	  p.1068.	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should	  not	  command	  the	  impossible,	  the	  law	  cannot	  impose	  a	  type	  of	  husband	  or	  wife	  
to	  anyone39.	  
There	  is	  another	  key	  element	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  American	  scholars	  that	  we	  must	  not	  
forget.	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   respect	   for	   the	   dignity	   of	   the	   person.	   It	   has	   been	   said	   that	  
discrimination	  involves	  biases40.	  	  This	  type	  of	  discrimination	  happens	  when	  somebody	  
considers	   another	   individual	   inferior	   because	   they	   are	   a	  member	   of	   another	   group.	  
Conversely	   discrimination	   based	   on	   prejudice	  means	   that	   a	   person	   is	   deemed	   to	   be	  
unworthy	  for	  a	  job	  due	  to	  a	  specific	  characteristic	  that	  is	  shared	  between	  the	  members	  
of	  his	  group.	  	  	  
Discrimination	  based	  on	  bias	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  widespread	  in	  the	  private	  than	  in	  the	  
commercial	   sphere.	   This	   can	   provoke	   social	   isolation,	   psychological	   effects	   and	  
stigmatization.	  In	  fact,	  private	  discrimination	  may	  be	  more	  unjust	  and	  more	  harmful	  that	  
the	  so	  called	  “commercial	  discrimination”41.	  	  
Professor	  Nussbum	  offers	  another	  approach	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  dignity	  in	  relation	  with	  
the	  collision	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  She	  understands	  that	  any	  case	  of	  conflict	  between	  
two	  fundamental	  rights,	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  case	  to	  be	  analyzed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  human	  
dignity.	  For	  example,	  she	  considers	  that	  if	  we	  seek	  to	  respect	  dignity,	  we	  must	  guarantee	  
the	   right	   of	   an	   individual	   to	   exercise	   his	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   the	   right	   of	   not	   being	  
unfairly	  discriminated	  against	  by	  an	  employer.	  On	  both	  sides	  human	  dignity	  means	  to	  
protect	  the	  right	  to	  exercise	  a	  fundamental	  right,	  but	  those	  rights	  collide.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  
Nussbum	  responds	  that	  each	  case	  deserves	  a	  different	  solution	  and	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  
to	  establish	  a	  hierarchy	  between	  rights42.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 DRIPPS, Donald A. Is the Privilege…” p.1065-1067.	  
40	  ALEXANDER,	  Larry,	   “What	  Makes	  Wrongful	  Discrimination	  Wrong?	  Biases,	  Preferences,	  Stereotypes	  
and	  Proxies,	  141	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  Rev.	  141,	  158-­‐163	  (1992)	  
41	  LOURY,	  Glenn	  C.,	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Racial	  Inequality,	  95,	  (2002),	  believes	  that	  private	  discrimination	  in	  
contract	  can	  be	  very	  daming.	  
42	  NUSSBAUM,	  Martha	  C.,	  Women	  and	  Human	  Development:	  The	  Capabilities	  Approach.	  Advocating	  a	  
new	  approach	  for	  how	  governments	  should	  treat	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens,	  2001,	  p.72-­‐81	  (*Quoted	  by	  Sonu	  
Bedi,	  p.	  1184-­‐1185*)	  
20	  
	  
Moreover,	  Professor	  Dripps	  explains	  that	  the	  privilege	  for	  private	  discrimination	  indeed	  
tends	  to	  track	  a	  widely-­‐felt	  sense	  that	  autonomy	  has	  special	  value	  in	  some	  spheres	  of	  
human	   life,	  also	  the	  non-­‐regulated	  behaviors	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  cases	  of	  wrongful	  
discrimination.	  Therefore,	  these	  cases	  should	  be	  controlled	  by	  the	  State	  if	  not	  directly,	  
at	  least	  indirectly.	  
He	  adds	  that	  throughout	  the	  developed	  world,	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  
and	  sexual	  privacy	  enjoy	  more	  respect43,	  legally	  and	  socially,	  than	  the	  right	  to	  contract,	  
to	  own	  weapons,	  or	  to	  consume	  intoxicants.	  And	  that	  this	  hierarchy	  of	  liberties	  may	  turn	  
out	  to	  be	  arbitrary,	  but	  it	  prevails	  so	  widely	  that	  we	  should	  assume	  it44.	  	  
However,	  if	  the	  prohibition	  to	  discriminate	  can	  affect	  not	  only	  the	  commercial	  sphere	  
but	  the	  private	  one,	  and	  if	  relations	  between	  individuals	  can	  be	  controlled	  even	  when	  
they	  are	  not	  regulated	  by	  the	  law,	  what	  is	  the	  mechanism	  and	  what	  are	  the	  criteria	  to	  
decide	  when	  those	  discriminatory	  actions	  are	  wrong?	  
The	   first	  question	  was	  answered	   in	  Shelley	  v.	  Kraemer,	  334,	  US	  1	   (1948)	  as	  we	  have	  
discussed	  above.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  second	  question,	  Professor	  Lippert-­‐Rasmussen	  
states	  that	  there	  is	  a	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  private	  discrimination	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
case	   that	   there	  ought,	  morally	   speaking,	   to	  be	  a	   law	   that	  prohibits	   engaging	   in	   such	  
activities.	  He	  explains	   that	   it	   is	  a	  moral	  approach,	   this	  means	   that	   the	  differentiating	  
element	  should	  be	  the	  qualification	  of	  the	  discriminatory	  conduct	  as	  just	  or	  unjust45.	  
However,	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  can	  be	  abstract	  and	  unattainable	  in	  this	  particular	  field.	  
Therefore,	  he	  distinguishes	  between	  private	  discrimination	  that	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  and	  
what	  is	  not.	  	  	  In	  each	  case,	  he	  studies	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  there	  could	  be	  a	  legal	  duty	  not	  
to	  engage.	  From	  this	  standpoint,	  a	  legal	  duty	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  case	  of	  wrongful	  private	  
discrimination,	  would	  be	  when	  an	  employer	  pays	  women	  less	  than	  men	  for	  doing	  the	  
same	  job,	  which	  is	  obviously	  forbidden	  by	  law.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  his	  opinion	  is	  that	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  Hudnut	  v.	  Am.	  Booksellers	  Ass’n,	  771	  F.2d	  323,	  330	  (7th	  Cir,	  1985).	  
44	  DRIPPS	  Donald	  A.,	  “Is	  the	  Privilege	  of	  Private	  Discrimination	  an	  Artifact	  of	  an	  Icon?,	  43	  San	  Diego	  L.	  Rev.	  
1063,	  2006	  (1063-­‐1069)	  p.1064.	  He	  sums	  up	  that	  the	  priviledge	   liberties	  turn	  out	  to	  protect	  the	  same	  
zones	  of	  life	  that	  enjoy	  the	  privilege	  of	  private	  discrimination.	  
45	  LIPPERT-­‐RASMUSSEN,	  Kasper,	  “Private	  Discrimination:	  A	  Prioritarian	  Desert-­‐Accommodating	  Account”,	  
43	  San	  Diego,	  L.	  Rev.	  817,	  2006.	  (817-­‐856)	  p.851.	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legal	  duty	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  private	  discrimination	  that	  is	  not	  wrongful	  could	  be	  the	  case	  
of	  sectarian	  donations,	  which	  are	  acts	  that	  bring	  about	  more	  moral	  value	  than	  would	  be	  
brought	  by	  not	  donating,	  but	  that	  can	  fuel	  social,	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  tensions.	  In	  its	  view	  
the	  law	  should	  enforce	  a	  pattern	  of	  nonsectarian	  donations	  that	  would	  be	  a	  collective	  
good	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  all	  donors46.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  European	  terminology	  has	  been	  embraced	  by	  the	  American	  scholars,	  who	  
use	  it	  when	  they	  distinguish	  between	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  discrimination.	  Therefore,	  
it	  is	  said	  that	  a	  vertical	  effect	  constrains	  state	  or	  governmental	  power,	  this	  means	  that	  
a	  right	  is	  violated	  only	  when	  a	  political	  body	  acts	  in	  a	  certain	  way;	  and	  a	  horizontal	  effect	  
constrains	  non-­‐state	  or	  private	  sector.	  This	  means	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  not	  violate	  the	  
rights	  of	  another47.	  Moreover,	  North	  American	  scholars	  also	  distinguish	  between	  direct	  
and	  indirect	  horizontal	  effects	  (since	  the	  case	  Griggs	  vs.	  Duke	  Power	  Company48),	  and	  
they	  say	  that	  a	  direct	  effect	  occurs	  when	  the	  constitutional	  right	  is	  applied	  directly	  to	  
the	   dispute	   and	   the	   indirect	   one	   is	  where	   it	   is	   used	   to	   interpret	   or	   limit	   an	   already	  
existing	  legal	  dispute49..	  	  
	  
3-­‐	  CONCLUSION	  
	  In	   conclusion,	   we	   see	   parallels	   between	   American	   and	   European	   Law	   when	   they	  
approach	  the	  problem	  of	  discrimination	  between	  individuals.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  starting	  
point	  is	  the	  consideration	  of	  a	  direct	  impact	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  public	  powers,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	   LIPPERT-­‐RASMUSSEN,	   Kasper,	   “Private	  Discrimination…”	  p.	   855.	  He	   adds	   the	   following	  possibilities:	  
Legal	  duty	   to	  engage	   in	  wrongful	  private	  discriminations,	  which	  would	  be	   the	  case	   in	  which	   the	  State	  
adopts	  an	  immoral	  discriminatory	  law,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  that	  oblige	  the	  majority	  to	  discriminate	  against	  the	  
minority.	   Legal	   right	   to	   engage	  wrongful	   private	   discrimination,	   such	   as	   the	   case	   of	   the	   persons	  who	  
discriminate	  in	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  or	  religion	  in	  their	  choice	  of	  spouse.	  Legal	  duty	  or	  permission	  to	  engage	  
in	  private	  discrimination	   that	   is	   not	  wrongful,	   for	   example	   the	   case	  of	   affirmative	   action	  programs	  at	  
private	  universities	  and	  companies	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  society	  with	  less	  discrimination.	  This	  means	  to	  redistribute	  
resources	  to	  badly-­‐off	  people.	  
47	  BEDI,	  Sonu,	  “The	  Horizontal	  Effect	  of	  a	  Right	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  in	  Employment:	  Religious	  autonomy	  
under	  the	  US	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Constitution	  of	  South	  Africa”,	  95	  B.U.	  L.	  Rev.(Boston	  University	  Law	  
Review),	  1181-­‐1204,	  1185,	  2015.	  TUSHNET,	  Mark,	  Weak	  Courts,	  Strong	  Rights,	  196-­‐99,	  2008.	  GARDBAUM,	  
Stephen,	  “The	  Horizontal	  Effect	  of	  Constitutional	  	  Rights”,	  102	  Mich.	  L.	  Rev.	  387,	  393,	  2003.	  
48	  Griggs	  vs.	  Duke	  Power	  Company,	  (1971)	  401	  US	  424	  91	  S	  Ct	  849.	  
49	  BEDI,	  Sonu,	  “The	  Horizontal…”	  p.1187	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not	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  judge	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  unjust	  
discrimination	  against	  a	  person	  when	  he	  makes	  a	  ruling.	  If	  he	  does	  so,	  the	  victim	  could	  
ask	   for	   the	   support	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   (US)	   or	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   (Spain,	  
Germany),	  which	  will	  be	  obliged	  to	  correct	  the	  wrong	  decision	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  guarantee	  
the	  right	  of	  the	  victim	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  wrongfully	  discriminated.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  
define	  the	  limits	  to	  private	  autonomy,	  American	  scholars	  are	  more	  focused	  on	  morality	  
than	  the	  European	  ones,	  but	  in	  both	  systems	  the	  respect	  for	  human	  dignity	  seems	  to	  
hold	   a	   key	   position.	   Moreover,	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   so	   called	   “private”	  
discrimination	  and	  the	  “commercial”	  one	  affirmed	  by	  American	  scholars	  has	  not	  been	  
contemplated	  by	  European	  scholars,	  and	  perhaps	  it	  is	  founded	  on	  unstable	  grounds.	  
Our	  conclusion	  can	  be	  summarized	  in	  two	  pivotal	  points:	  
First,	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  determination	  of	  wrongful	  discriminatory	  behaviors	  is	  a	  
matter	  connected	  with	  the	  abuse	  of	  right	  as	  a	  limit	  of	  the	  private	  autonomy,	  a	  matter	  
relating	  to	  human	  dignity	  or	  simply	  is	  a	  question	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  the	  two	  fundamental	  
rights	  in	  conflicts	  takes	  precedence	  over	  the	  other.	  As	  aforementioned	  this	  is	  a	  question	  
discussed	  by	  Spanish	  Scholars.	  	  My	  opinion	  is	  that	  this	  is	  neither	  a	  problem	  of	  abuse	  of	  
rights,	  nor	  a	  problem	  of	  human	  dignity.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  a	  case	  of	  a	  collision	  between	  two	  
fundamental	  rights	  in	  which	  the	  court	  ought	  to	  waive	  which	  one	  prevails,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
balancing	  all	  the	  interests	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  each	  specific	  case.	  
Consequently,	  the	  key	  element	  to	  decide	  cannot	  be	  the	  human	  dignity.	  Human	  dignity	  
is	  too	  nebulous	  a	  concept	  which	  can	  be	  clouded	  by	  individual	  subjectivity.	  The	  problem	  
is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  framing	  and	  delimiting	  the	  concept	  of	  dignity.	  We	  think	  that	  the	  best	  
approach	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  equality.	  Moreover,	  the	  concept	  of	  equality	  has	  
been	  subject	  to	  deep	  scrutiny	  by	  scholars.	  	  
In	  a	  specific	  case,	  if	  there	  is	  conduct	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  equal	  treatment	  principle,	  what	  
should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  is	  the	  fundamental	  right	  which	  should	  be	  protected	  
from	  this	  behaviour.	  And	  only	  after	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  the	  circumstances	  could	  it	  
be	  decided	  if	  such	  a	  behavior	  deserves	  legal	  protection.	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  case	  in	  which	  
a	  private	  religious	  educational	  center	  hires	  a	  teacher	  that	  later	  acts	  against	  the	  center-­‐
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wide	  ideology	  could	  be	  used.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  has	  affirmed	  that	  the	  
dismissal	   of	   a	   worker	   by	   a	   church,	   due	   to	   difference	   in	   religious	   ideology	   from	   the	  
doctrine	  of	  that	  church,	  was	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  private	  life.	  We	  refer	  to	  the	  
case	  	  Obst	  v.	  Germany50,	  in	  which	  the	  	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  decided	  that	  the	  
dismissal	   of	   the	   European	   director	   of	   public	   relations	   of	   the	   Mormon	   church	   for	  
adultery,	  was	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  privacy.	  The	  Court	  said	  that	  in	  consideration	  
with	  the	  position	  held	  by	  Mr.	  Obst,	  not	  being	  fired	  would	  adversely	  affect	  the	  credibility	  
of	   the	  Mormon	  church.	   In	   fact,	  adultery	   is	   strongly	  condemned	  by	   this	  church51.	  The	  
European	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  autonomous	  existence	  of	  religious	  communities	  is	  
indispensable	   for	   pluralism	   in	   a	   democratic	   society,	   and	   affirmed	   that	   the	   right	   of	  
religious	  communities	  to	  an	  autonomous	  existence	  is	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  protection	  
that	  the	  article	  9	  of	  the	  ECHR	  affords	  52.	  Therefore,	  this	  example	  illuminates	  us	  about	  
how	  things	  work:	  there	  is	  a	  collision	  between	  two	  fundamental	  rights,	  right	  to	  religion	  
and	  right	  to	  privacy,	  and	  according	  with	  the	  interests	  at	  stake,	  the	  court	  decided	  that	  in	  
a	   specific	   case	   the	   right	   to	   religion	   should	   prevail	   over	   the	   right	   to	   privacy,	   and	  
consequently,	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  employer	  seek	  protection	  from	  a	  fundamental	  
right,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  other	  circumstances	  it	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  wrongfully	  
discriminatory	  conduct.	  
	  
Secondly,	  I	  conclude	  that	  to	  limit	  the	  effects	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  vertical	  relations	  
(relations	  between	  public	  authorities	  and	  individuals)	  and	  not	  apply	  them	  to	  horizontal	  
ones	  (relations	  between	  individuals)	  implies	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  partial	  and	  biased	  view	  of	  our	  
legal	  system	  and	  constitutional	  order.	  
The	   idea	  of	   justice	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	   law,	  that	  
illuminate	  the	  whole	  legal	  system,	  should	  prevail	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law.	  	  In	  fact,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Judgment	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Obst	  v.	  Germany	  of	  23	  of	  September	  of	  2010.	  
51	   See	  Gerhard	   Robbers	   (2010)	   “Church	   Autonomy	   in	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   –	   Recent	  
Developments	  in	  Germany”	  (2010),	  Journaly	  of	  Law	  and	  Religion,	  26,	  pp.281-­‐320.	  
52	  Art.9.1.	  ECHR:	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  thought,	  conscience	  and	  religion;	  this	  right	  includes	  
freedom	  to	  change	  his	  religion	  or	  belief	  and	  freedom,	  either	  alone	  or	  in	  community	  with	  others	  and	  in	  
public	  or	  private,	  to	  manifest	  his	  religion	  or	  belief,	  in	  worship,	  teaching,	  practice	  and	  observance.	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the	  first	  article	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitution	  states	  that	  “Spain	  is	  hereby	  established	  as	  a	  
social	   and	   democratic	   State,	   subject	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   which	   advocates	   freedom,	  
equality	  and	  political	  pluralism	  as	  highest	  values	  of	  its	  legal	  system”.	  Therefore,	  the	  first	  
article	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitution	  imposes	  the	  equality	  as	  fundamental	  premise	  to	  be	  
always	  applied	  in	  the	  legal	  system.	  This	  means	  that	  not	  only	  public	  authorities,	  but	  also	  
individuals	  are	  directly	   linked	  to	  this	  mandatory	  norm.	  It	   is	  true	  that	  article	  53	  of	  the	  
Spanish	  Constitution	  states	  that	  “The	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  recognised	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  
the	  present	  part	  are	  binding	  on	  all	  public	  authorities”,	  but	  as	  it	  has	  been	  said	  by	  a	  part	  
of	  the	  doctrine53,	  this	  article	  only	  provides	  an	  addition	  to	  what	  has	  been	  stated	  by	  the	  
first	  article.	  Consequently,	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  
not	  limited	  to	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  public	  powers	  and	  the	  individuals,	  but	  also	  to	  
the	  relations	  between	  individuals.	  
In	   any	   case,	   it	   does	   not	   make	   sense	   to	   deny	   the	   horizontal	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   rights,	   whilst	   simultaneously	   recognising	   the	   right	   of	   any	   citizen	   to	  
effective	  legal	  protection	  if	  a	  court	  infringes	  his	  fundamental	  rights,	  thereby	  resulting	  in	  
discriminatory	   treatment.	  We	   should	   remember	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   European	   and	  
American	   scholars	   affirm	   that	   an	   individual	   has	   the	   right	   to	   appeal	   before	   the	  
Constitutional	  or	   Supreme	  Court	   if	   a	   judge	  has	  not	  protected	  his	   fundamental	   rights	  
when	  giving	  a	  judgment.	  
With	  this	  approach	  we	  hope	  to	  offer	  a	  reasonable	  legal	  explanation	  about	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  fundamental	  rights	  work	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals.	  This	  is	  an	  approach	  
which	   does	   not	   open	   dangerous	   gaps	   where	   the	   right	   to	   discriminate	   might	   seem	  
unimpeded.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  extend	  directly	  the	  effect	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  
to	  horizontal	   relations.	   In	   this	  way,	   it	   can	  no	   longer	  be	  possible	   to	  affirm	  that	   in	   the	  
private	  sphere	  it	  is	  legal	  to	  adopt	  decisions	  based	  on	  racists	  or	  macho	  behaviours,	  for	  
example	  when	  a	  landlord	  refuses	  a	  person	  as	  a	  tenant	  saying	  that	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  
have	  a	  gipsy	  or	  an	  African	  as	  a	  tenant.	  In	  any	  case,	  if	  the	  law	  protects	  the	  conduct	  of	  an	  
individual,	  it	  should	  be	  due	  to	  other	  considerations,	  but	  not	  because	  such	  an	  individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	   NARANJO	  DE	   LA	   CRUZ,	   Rafael,	   “Los	   límites	   de	   los	   derechos	   fundamentales	   en	   las	   relaciones	   entra	  
particulares:	  la	  buena	  fe”.	  Centro	  de	  Estudios	  Políticos	  y	  Constitucionales,	  Madrid,	  2000,	  *	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could	  have	  the	  right	  to	  discriminate	  another	  person	  without	  restriction.	  To	  place	  these	  
horizontal	   relations	   under	   direct	   judicial	   control	   is	   vital	   in	   order	   to	   properly	   protect	  
individuals	  in	  their	  social	  relations,	  particularly	  when	  there	  is	  no	  contract	  between	  the	  
parties.	  From	  this	  perspective	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  good	  model	  to	  follow	  is	  the	  one	  included	  
in	  the	  constitution	  of	  South	  Africa.	  
	  
